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Abstract
The public transport network of a region inhabited by more than 4 million people is run by a
complex interplay of public and private actors. Large amounts of data are generated by
travellers, buying and using various forms of tickets and passes. Analysing the data is of
paramount importance for the governance and sustainability of the system. This manuscript
reports the early results of the privacy analysis which is being undertaken as part of the analysis
of the clearing process in the Emilia-Romagna region, in Italy, which will compute the
compensations for tickets bought from one operator and used with another. In the manuscript it
is shown by means of examples that the clearing data may be used to violate various privacy
aspects regarding users, as well as (technically equivalent) trade secrets regarding operators.
The ensuing discussion has a twofold goal. First, it shows that after researching possible
existing solutions, both by reviewing the literature on general privacy-preserving techniques,
and by analysing similar scenarios that are being discussed in various cities across the world,
the former are found exhibiting structural effectiveness deficiencies, while the latter are found of
limited applicability, typically involving less demanding requirements. Second, it traces a
research path towards a more effective approach to privacy-preserving data management in the
specific context of public transport, both by refinement of current sanitization techniques and by
application of the privacy by design approach.
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Introduction
The current trend in management of public
transport systems is to outsource services
to multiple private operators, requiring them
to integrate their ticketing and fare system
with one another. When this concept is
introduced in regions that used to have
single local entities managing every aspect
of ticketing, or that conversely left operators
free to adopt incompatible, separate
ticketing systems, a new layer of
coordination must be put in place.
There are many examples of this kind of
approach around the world, such as the
Oyster card system in London, the Octopus
card system in Hong Kong, or the
Istanbulkart in Istanbul just to name a few.
As a case study, this paper considers the
Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, where the
Regional Government has been running for
several years a project to integrate the
control processes of the various transport
companies operating in the region. These
companies typically operate over disjoint
territories, and they used to manage
independent and localized ticketing systems.
The trend with the new regional system is to
go more and more towards integration of
tariffs, routes and ticketing, so that the
citizen may buy a ticket in city by a given
operator and use it in another city with
another operator. While providing an
improved service to citizen this approach
also brings some additional burden, since a
clearing system is needed to share the
revenue of tickets sales according to the
actual service each operator has provided
(and thus, supposedly, to the real costs it
has incurred).
Data detailing every trip, collected by public
transport operators, previously confined to
internal use only, now must be shared and
can potentially harm passengers. The
system that manages it does not merely
need to control data disclosure, but has to
be designed to manage potential risks
during the collection and processing of data.
This is a challenging task, which must
manage privacy risks appropriately on the

one hand, and preserve data utility to a level
that guarantee usefulness for clearing
purposes on the other hand. This paper
illustrates the work the authors are doing to
design and test the clearing system in a way
that safeguards the protection of personal
information, not as a result of some policy
superimposed to the existing functions, but
rather taking into account this requisite from
the start, by applying the principles of
Privacy by Design.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the local context and the general
ideas behind the clearing system are briefly
presented and reviewed, and research
questions are stated. Section 3 gives an
overview of the general principles of data
sanitization for the purpose of safe release
of sensitive information. Section 4 illustrates
the risks connected with the release of
sensitive information, focusing on the
desanitization attacks that exploit public
data sources, and Section 5 gives two
examples of how these attacks can affect
the clearing datasets. Section 6 describes
the general principles of Privacy by Design,
and outlines the direction of current and
future work to apply them to the scenario of
the clearing system, before conclusions are
draft in Section 7.

The Clearing System Scenario
The Local Context
The
Emilia-Romagna
Region
has
approximately a population of 4.5 Million
with an area of 22500 square Kilometres.
About half of the population leaves in the 13
main cities that are lined along the ancient
Roman road called “Via Emilia”1 which gives
its name to the Region. Emilia-Romagna is
highly industrialized with a number of
1

The Via Aemilia, named after the Roman
consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, was completed
in 187 BC and runs from Piacenza, in the central
part of the largest plain (Pianura Padana) in
northern Italy, to Rimini on the Adriatic sea
shore in an almost straight line for about 250 km.
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companies typically spread along the Via
Emilia around the main urban centres. For
this reason the mobility infrastructures are a
key part of the logistics supporting the
economy of the region.

involved in its use. This is called clearing
process, and has to be implemented in a
way accepted fairly by the whole set of
operators involved, to guarantee the
integrated system sustainability.

The estimate of daily trips made by EmiliaRomagna citizens for work or leisure is
about 9 Millions of which 25% walk or bike
and 8% by public transport means. The
public transportation system is built around
a rail backbone basically parallel to the Via
Emilia which links the main urban centres.
Local transportation systems in the cities
mostly use buses. The local systems are
run by four large operators and a few small
operators on specific routes.

The Clearing System

The policy maker is the regional Mobility
and Transport Councillorship which is
competent, among many subjects, for the
planning of the infrastructural network,
regional and local mobility systems. Over
the last decade the Councillorship pursued
service integration and multi-modality of
public mobility systems, promoting, in
particular, the deployment of regional
integrated fares with an investment of about
20 M€ in supporting hardware (central
control systems, ticketing machines, vehicle
monitoring systems etc.).
The issue of the MiMuovo (I move) chip
card was the flagship project of the fare
integration process, supporting multi-modal
tickets valid over a given path spanning
several operators and transport means. For
instance a user holding a MiMuovo card
with an integrated travel contract is allowed
to use the bus (run by operator A) in his
home town to reach the railway station, the
train (run by operator B) to his/her working
town and the bus (run by operator C) to
his/her working place. To date about
300,000 MiMuovo cards have been
deployed and are used daily.
Today the Councillorship is also fostering
fare integration for single trip tickets that can
be bought in any town and used in any
other within the Region. This requires the
operator selling the ticket to share the
revenue with other operators, if they are

The clearing system is based on a
distributed architecture in which each
operator is responsible for the management
and maintenance of its own data. The data
needed for the computation of the clearing
function is collected in a clearing database
located in a central processing centre,
operated by a regional in-house company,
in order to guarantee neutrality and to avoid
disturbing the production systems of the
operators.
The creation of the clearing database
requires the sharing of the operators
dataset in a standard, machine readable
format, thus creating a possible threat as a
consequence of secondary uses. Moreover
the regional Councillorship aims at using the
data for in-depth analysis of the transport
system performance. Eventually, part of the
datasets could be released to the public as
open data.
Operators and public bodies do not have
any effective control over future uses of
their dataset once it is publicly available.
Unfortunately the data about sales and
usage may reveal issues the operators
consider part of their industrial secrets
and/or sensitive information in terms of
personal privacy.
This problem can be (partly) mitigated by
applying full anonymization safeguards,
which is very difficult when the utility of the
database is to be maintained. Moreover, it is
possible to adequately inform the involved
subjects of the intention to disseminate the
dataset in an open data format, alerting
them to potential risks, but this action can
limit the degree of user acceptance,
especially if the policy intentionally leaves
open what kind of secondary uses of their
data will be done. Therefore a trivial solution
to the issue does not exist.

Pacific Asia Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 4, pp.25-50 / December 2015

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2015

27
3

Pacific Asia Journal of the Association for Information Systems, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4
Privacy-Preserving Design of Data Processing Systems / Callegati et al.

Research Questions
From the point of view of the users, in the
widest sense that encompasses passengers,
operators, and regulators, the most pressing
questions to be answered are: with the
current data storage and utilization
processes, is it possible to breach data
privacy and re-identify the data subjects?
Which kind of processing and links to
people and business-related issues are
possible, for example by matching the
clearing database data with other external
databases? From the point of view of the
researchers, these questions can be
answered by analysing the underlying
scientific and technical tools: what features
do the current data sanitization algorithms
exhibit? Is it possible to measure their
effectiveness in any given scenario?
Symmetrically, can the experience gathered
from similar projects in other cities/regions
point our research in the right direction, or
are our requisites too specific?
Once the background analysis is complete,
if it highlights deficiencies either in the basic
technologies or in their application to
specific scenarios, the research activity will
be directed towards the definition of a more
effective framework for public transport data
sanitization.

Sanitization: A Critical Overview
The architecture outlined in Section 2.2
introduces two possible security attack
vectors. The first one is the intrusion of an
unauthorized party, in which data are
subtracted from the primary database; this
is a classical issue of information security
and access control, and this work does not
deal with its direct form; yet, it takes into
account the similar situation of purposely
releasing data for public use, considering
that it could be enriched though correlation
with external data sources, to the extent of
disclosing details that should not be made
public. The second one is called an insider
attack, also referred to as an insider threat;
this type of attack arises due to a malicious

threat from somehow authorized actors,
from inside the organizations that are
legitimately involved in data collection and
processing; the next chapter illustrates ways
to perform this kind of attacks and
corresponding effects.
A data sanitization phase is commonly
proposed in the literature as the necessary
step to prevent these issues; this phase as
defined by Crawford et al. (2007), is "the
process of altering [a dataset] so that it
remains usable for beneficial purposes,
while minimizing its use for harmful
purposes". To properly define this process,
the key issue to deal with is to understand
what "keeping the beneficial purposes" and
"minimizing the harmful purposes" mean.
Ideally, the process should be able to
manipulate the data in a way that prevents
privacy attacks but at the same time
preserves the possibility of performing many
kinds of economic computations. To
progress towards this goal, the existing
literature is analysed to find (a) whether
convincing measures of utility and
vulnerability of the dataset exist and (b)
whether existing algorithms result in positive
trade-offs when applied to our context.
The literature was analysed as follows.
Starting from the basic requisite of having to
anonymize the data, the generallyapplicable
techniques
of
data
anonymization were reviewed, highlighting
their limitations.
Next, the application of these techniques to
the clearing scenario was attempted, taking
into account the literature on the evaluation
of these techniques, namely verifying the
impact of their known limitations, and
introducing metrics that allow to determine
whether a satisfying level of privacy is
attained.
Subsequently, the symmetrical path was
followed, starting from similar cases for
which documentation of the process of
transport data privacy protection exists,
such as those of Montreal and Amsterdam.
However, the analysis of the various
aspects highlighted that, even though there
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are important points of contact, these
experiences did not need to take into
account some requirements that turn out to
be of critical importance for the clearing
scenario. As a consequence, the techniques
devised for those systems would leave ours
subject to numerous types of attack, both of
kinds already known in the literature, and of
other kinds described in this paper as proofs
of concept.
For each section reviewing a specific
subject, a table is provided at the end,
summarizing the most relevant literature
sources, their contribution, and the open
issues (both in terms of intrinsic limitations
of the methods and of gap between the
methods and the requirements of the
specific scenario of this paper).

General-Purpose Sanitization
Approaches in the Literature
As a preliminary consideration, to
understand the way algorithms manipulate
datasets to achieve the aforementioned
results, it is useful to note that every
approach is based on the classification of
data elements according to the potentially
sensitive information in three categories
(Ranjit and Acharya, 2008; Zevenbergen et
al., 2013):
Identifier attributes (or identifiers)
can individually distinguish the data subject
more or less directly. Typical identifiers
include: name, address, social security
numbers, mobile phone number, IMEI
number.
Quasi identifier (or key) attributes
can be used to identify a data subject using
auxiliary sources of information, by linking to
databases
that
contain
identifying
information. They are indirect identifiers of a
data subject, which make an individual more
distinctive in a population. Typical key
attributes include: age, race, gender, date of
birth, and place of residence.
Sensitive (or secondary) attributes
cannot individually identify a data subject
directly and may require significant amounts

of auxiliary data to be useful for reidentification purposes. A data subject may
then be identified individually through more
sophisticated
methods
such
as
fingerprinting, rather than mere linking of
databases. Examples include settings in an
application, battery level measured over
time, or location patterns.
In summary, the literature describes four
main techniques of data anonymization.
k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002; Ciriani
et al., 2007) is the most well-known
technique for generalization. The basic
principle here is to replace exact values with
ranges, wide enough to guarantee that
every attribute in a database appears with
identical values in a given number of other
rows, forming a group of k rows
indistinguishable from each other. This
approach may take the form, for example, of
grouping subjects’ locations into sufficiently
large areas such that no set of locations is
unique to any individual. The enforcement
of k-anonymity requires the preliminary
identification of the quasi-identifier. The
quasi-identifier, as previously defined,
depends on the external information
available to the recipient, as this determines
her ability to make correlations (not all
possible external data sources are available
to every possible data recipient); different
quasi-identifiers can potentially exist for a
given
table.
Many
variations
and
improvements exist, yet k-anonymity
techniques cannot hide whether an
individual is in the dataset, and it performs
poorly in protecting sensitive attributes
against attacks based on background
knowledge or on the knowledge of the
details of its application. (L. Sweeney, 2002)
l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al.,
2006) is an improvement of k-anonymity
that require the sensitive attribute
associated with each quasi-identifier to
appear at least with l different values. Other
refinements have been proposed, but as
described also in Pingshui et al. (2013)
processing a large dataset to achieve ldiversity is time-consuming and vulnerable
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to inference attacks in presence of a series
of updated publications of the same dataset,
if it is simply re-anonymized with the same
approach every time. Finally the added
requirements proved to be neither
necessary nor sufficient to prevent sensitive
attribute disclosure (Li et al., 2007).
An example of the effects of the application
of k-anonymity and l-diversity techniques on
the dataset that is the object of our study is
shown in Figure 1.
t-closeness (Machanavajjhala, 2007)
To improve robustness of k-anonymity, the
same authors of l-diversity also proposed a
privacy notion called t-closeness, which
requires that the distribution of a sensitive
attribute in any equivalence class is close to
the distribution of the attribute in the overall
table (i.e., the distance between the two
distributions should not be greater than a
threshold t). In other words, an equivalence
class is said to have t-closeness if the

distance between the distribution of a
sensitive attribute in this class and the
distribution of the attribute in the whole table
is no more than a threshold t. A table is said
to have t-closeness if all equivalence
classes have t-closeness.
Differential Privacy is a process
derived from cryptography. As defined in
Roth (2014), it “aims to provide means to
maximize the accuracy of queries from
statistical databases while minimizing the
chances of identifying its records.” Unlike
other methods, differential privacy operates
off a solid mathematical foundation, making
it possible to provide strong theoretical
guarantees on the privacy and utility of
released data. The most used technique is
called ε-differential privacy and it is
modelled via a randomized algorithm; a
theoretical definition is given in (Neustar,
2014) and summarized as follows.

Figure 1 - Effects of anonymization techniques on the transport dataset
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“A randomized function K gives ε-differential
privacy if for all data sets D and D′ differing
on at most one row, and all S ⊆ Range(K),”
Pr[K(D) ⊆ S] >= exp(ε) x Pr[K(D') ⊆ S]
This formula can be interpreted as stating
that the risk to one’s privacy should not
substantially (as bounded by ε) increase as
a result of participating in a statistical
database. Namely, that an attacker should
not be able to learn any information about
any participant that they could not learn if
the participant had opted out of the
database. This goal is pursued by adding
some noise to the result of a query on the
dataset. There exist many different
mathematic mechanisms to do that; the
most commonly seen in this context is the
Laplace mechanism, which adds noise
derived from the Laplace distribution. It has
only one parameter, defining the standard

deviation, or noisiness. This parameter
should have some dependence on the
privacy parameter, ε; it should also depend
on the nature of the query itself, and more
specifically, the risk to the most different
individual of having their private information
teased out of the data.
Differential privacy comes in many different
forms and variations which have not been
covered in detail, but they all have several
limitations, due in particular to the high
computational
complexity
that
the
cryptographic techniques could introduce in
a big dataset. The main advantage of this
approach is that its mathematical foundation
makes it possible to actually measure the
strength or the weakness of the results. The
concept of differential privacy holds much
potential, and is still the topic of active
research.

Table 1 - summary of general-purpose sanitization techniques
SOURCE
Machanavajjhala et al.; 2006
Sweeney; 2002
Machanavajjhala; 2007
Li et al.; 2007;
Ciriani et al.; 2007;
Machanavajjhala; 2007
Pingshui et al.; 2013;

SUBJECT
k-anonimity

Roth; 2014
Neustar; 2014

Differential
Privacy

l-diversity

t-closeness

Sanitization in the Clearing Scenario
To ascertain the suitability of the illustrated
techniques to the clearing scenario, the first
step is to define the correct evaluation
criteria, which could depend from:
1. The context of collection and usage
of the data;
2. The structure of the data;
3. The objective of data processing.
As an example, the work of Brickell and
Shmatikov (2008) measures the trade-off

CONTRIBUTION
Practical application
General description
General description of the techniques, and
detailed explanation of the improvements
over k-anonymity
General description of the techniques, and
detailed explanation of the improvements
over k-anonymity
General description and guidelines for the
application of the procedure

between privacy (i.e., how much the
adversary can still learn from the sanitized
records) and utility (i.e., the residual
accuracy
of
data-mining
algorithms
executed on the sanitized records with
respect to what could be found for legitimate
purposes from the original data set). Their
paper showed that k-anonymity provides no
privacy improvement on the tested dataset;
furthermore, l-diversity is no better than
trivial anonymization. Another interesting
work Cormode et al. (2013) tries to quantify
the effectiveness of sanitization in terms of
privacy impact of a data release. To this end,
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the study introduces the idea of
incorporating a metric over 'privacy
breaches' based on a notion of empirical
privacy, and evaluating the corresponding
empirical utility of the released data. The
measure of a privacy breach is defined as
the increase in correct a-posteriori
inferences obtained by an adversary about
sensitive values in the data, using a
Bayesian classifier with previous knowledge.
The cited paper applies this metric to the
main four techniques, and concludes that
differential privacy often provides the best
empirical privacy for a baseline utility level,
but that for increasing utility levels it can be
preferable to adopt methods like t-closeness
or l-diversity. There are other works that
pursue the same kind of investigation, that
mainly derive as a conclusion the weakness
of k-anonymity and l-diversity algorithms.
The main limitation of the reviewed literature
is that only few papers interact with large
amounts of data derived from public
transport system. An exception is the paper
by Ghasemzadeh, Fung, Chen, Awasthi
(2013), which aims at preventing privacy
attacks in a general sense, especially those
damaging from a user's perspective. The
proposed solution is an algorithm based on
the LK-privacy model, using the approach of
“identifying the LK-privacy requirement, and
then eliminating the violating sequences by
a sequences of suppressions with the goal
of minimizing the impact on the structure of
the user tracking.” What the authors claim is
that their anonymization algorithm thwarts
identity record linkages, while effectively
preserving the information quality in terms
of its suitability for the generation of a
probabilistic flow-graph. It is a very
interesting result, yet insufficient in the
scenario of a clearing system, where the
user's privacy perspective is not the only
one that must be protected; in fact, the
insider threat is not taken into account.
Eventually, with the exception of differential
privacy (which cannot be easily applied to
huge amounts of data), it would seem that
not a single sanitization solution is really
effective.
Actually,
these
studies

demonstrate only how these techniques are
not effective enough for the particular
context taken into consideration. To
properly evaluate their potential in our
scenario, a more precise definition is
needed for various characteristics, namely:
1. the privacy requirements;
2. the expected level of utility of
datasets;
3. how to measure the effectiveness of
algorithms at preserving these
properties.
As regards privacy requirements and utility
levels, it is possible to reason on the
structure of sensitive values and quasiidentifier in our case study, represented in
Figure 2. The sensitive values are the user’s
identity and location data; these values are
the one to hide and protect. The means of
transportation and the user’s contract data,
otherwise, can be classified as quasiidentifier values, since they could become
sensitive if crossed with other information;
at the same time, these are the data needed
to calculate the clearing functions, so they
cannot be depleted because of the precise
information they carry. The goal of the
anonymization process is to break the link
between user identity and location, and to
mask the QI values in a way that preserves
the values needed for the clearing system.
As regards the metric used to quantify
privacy, there is very little literature. Atzori et
al (2007) created a metric called δ-presence
to evaluate the risk of identifying an
individual in a table based on generalization
of publicly known data. This work shows
that existing anonymization techniques are
inappropriate for situations where δpresence is a good metric (specifically,
where knowing that an individual is in the
database, as it very often happens to
travellers of public transportation networks).
So, despite its quality in general terms, this
metric cannot be used in our context.
Otherwise, the metric discussed in Ganta et
al. (2008) is defined as the amount of
“useful” data mining queries still existing
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after the sanitization phase. As shown in the
following section, an insider threat attack in
our context is likely to take the form of a

search pattern analysis; for this reason this
measure of privacy seems to be more
interesting.

Figure 2 - Sensitive data elements and their logical connections

Table 2 - strengths and limitations of sanitization techniques applied to the public
transport scenario
SOURCE
Bishop et al.; 2010
Barbaro and Zeller; 2006
Atzori et al; 2007

SUBJECT
k-anon., l-div., tcloseness limits and
vulnerabilities
Metrics to evaluate the
known anonymization
techniques in terms of
amount of privacy and
data utility

Ganta et al.; 2008
Brickell and Shmatikov; 2008
Cormode et al.; 2013

Threats
Known Attack Scenarios Against
Anonymization
As illustrated in Section 3, the residual
presence of one or more sensitive elements
in a dataset is structural, both because their
complete obliteration would remove any
utility from the dataset and because most
sanitization techniques have intrinsic
limitations. There are various motivations
driving attackers to exploit any possible data
source to un-conceal information, as
described for example by Narayanan and

CONTRIBUTION
Outline the limits of the discussed
techniques, and illustrate possible
attacks (not tied to specific scenarios)
Introduces the delta-presence metric,
which is useful to compare
anonymization techniques in terms of
effectiveness in hiding the presence of
an individual in a dataset
Introduces a metric to measure the
utility of the dataset after anonymization,
in terms of feasible queries
Other works about the utility of the
queries after anonymization using data
mining techniques

Shmatikov (2008) and summarized by
Bishop et al. (2010). Government agencies
are more and more involved in extensive
surveillance and are eager to collect any
kind of information, even remotely
connected with individuals. Marketing
campaigns often exploit
behavioural
targeting of advertisements, for which the
construction
of
networks
and
the
highlighting of patterns is essential.
Investigators, stalkers and employers may
want to target specific individuals, possibly
starting from a vantage point in terms of
background and context information.
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In our scenario, the clearing datasets could
be exploited by any of these categories
wishing to infer information regarding the
operators’ business and/or the passengers
of the public transportation system.
Moreover, there is a specific insider threat:
the participating companies may try to use
data
analysis
to
gain
competitive
advantages, both of the kind usually
associated with market analysis (e.g.
uncommonly profitable routes) and of the
kind usually regarded as a trade secret (e.g.
the optimization of the allocation of
resources such as buses, trains, and
personnel on board).
The main issue is that when pursuing their
goals, adversaries are not limited to the
analysis of the clearing data alone.
Conversely, they can reap great benefits
through correlation with many existing
public databases. The first widely known
case of identification through correlation of
different public datasets dates back to 2006,
when AOL released anonymous data about
search queries and New York Times
reporters were able to find the real name
linked to the pseudonym 4417749 (Barbaro
and Zeller, 2006). As noted by Bishop et al.
(2010) this case also shows a peculiar
effect of the failure of the privacy protection:
since the user acted as a proxy for friends
with no Internet access, her name was
associated to many queries unrelated to her
condition and habits. The same could
happen with public transportation data. As
an example, if zones of boarding and
alighting are kept wide enough to conceal
the exact location of a passenger, they
could end up enclosing points of interest
(hospitals, schools, recreational facilities,
shopping districts, etc.) which could lead an
attacker to draw wrong conclusions,
possibly even more damaging to the victim
than the correct ones.
While the AOL attack exploited various
public records, a more recent episode
targeted social networks (Narayanan and
Shmatikov, 2008) exploiting correlated data
from two networks attracting the same
community of movie enthusiasts (the Netflix

Prize and IMDB) to link user identities
between the two datasets by correlation of
their preferences. Social networks attract
vast numbers of users, they collect every
kind of personal information about them,
and they can be conveniently searched by
algorithms, thanks to the APIs provided to
foster their growth by turning them into
platforms for the development of social
games and applications. Two recent studies
regarding Twitter can be useful to
understand the implication of leaving this
kind of digital footprints. The WhACKY!
application “harnesses the multi-source
information from tweets to link Twitter
profiles across other external services [. . .]
to
map
Twitter
profiles
to
their
corresponding external service accounts
using publicly available APIs.” (Correa et al.,
2012). Their study highlights how much
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) can
be programmatically gathered from social
networks2, as reported in Table 3, and how
the correlations can fill the gaps to draw a
complete picture of an individual. (Calvino,
2015 - in Italian - translates as “Stalking
John Doe: surveillance, privacy and
proximity in the age of Twitter”)
demonstrated how the correlation between
the Twitter activity of an Italian user and the
publicly available census data allows to
reduce the uncertainty about the real-world
identity and location of the victim to a mere
1-in-789 inhabitants of an area just 2500
square meters wide.
It is worth noting that Golle and Partridge
(2009) already studied the correlation of
commutes with publicly available census
data back in 2009, spurring speculation
about how the increased use of locationcapable devices would affect privacy
(Narayanan, 2009). After four years, de
Montjoye et al. (2013), working on location
data from mobile telephone carriers, were
able to claim that “four spatio-temporal
points are enough to uniquely identify 95%
2 Many

other sites yield less PII, yet can be used
to link users with their location; just to give a few
examples: Noisetube, FixMyStreet,
OpenStreetMap, Panoramio
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of the individuals” and that “even coarse
datasets provide little anonymity”. A final
example of the risks associated with
location data is carried by the recent study
of possible privacy breaches as a
consequence of the traces left when renting
bikes in London. This is a very relevant
case for this paper, since the kind of data
used in the studies described hereinafter is
strikingly similar to what could be found in
our datasets. Siddle (2014) analysed a
publicly available Transport For London
dataset that contained records of bike
journeys for London’s bicycle hire scheme
over a period of six months between 2012
and 2013, reaching the conclusion that “with
a little effort, it’s possible to find the actual
people who have made the journeys”. The

study appeared in the news (Merriman,
2014), triggering TfL’s remedial action. In
the words of TfL’s General Manager of
Cycle Hire, Nick Aldworth “We’re committed
to improving transparency across all our
services and publish a range of data for
customers and stakeholders online. Due to
an administrative error, anonymized user
identification numbers were shown against
individual trips made between 22 July 2012
and 2 February 2013. The data, which did
not identify any individual customers online,
was removed as soon as the matter was
brought to our attention.” This episode
highlights that, on top of the privacy
concerns that must be taken into account
when designing the clearing system, leaks
are possible.

Table 3 - PII accessible from social networks via APIs
Flicker
Username
Name
V
Gender
Image
V
Relationship
Location
School
Company
Occupation
Hobbies
Music
Movies
Books
Contacts
V
Likes
V
Photos
V
Age
Videos
Description
Last access
Source: (Correa et al., 2012)

Foursquare
V
V
V
V
V
V
-

YouTube
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V

Last FM
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
-

Twitter
V
V
V
V
V
V
-

Facebook
V
V
V
-

Table 4 - analysis of correlation attacks on transport-related databases
SOURCE
Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008
Bishop et al.; 2010
Correa et al.; 2012
Calvino; 2015
Golle and Partridge; 2009
deMontjoye et al.; 2013

SUBJECT
Targeted
attacks on
anonymized
datasets.

CONTRIBUTION
Actual demonstration of the general
weakness illustrated in the previous section,
and of even greater risks deriving from the
availability of external data sources,
impossible to control, which can be used to
compute correlations through data mining or
by filtering queries based on specific targets
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Specific Attack Scenarios in Our
Context and Countermeasures
The kind of correlation with external
databases exemplified in the previous
section is feasible in our context too. Not
only it is possible to leverage online social
networks in the same way, but also to
browse many free-access databases of
sensitive data, strongly related to the
regional context. Just to give two examples,
it is very easy to extract from the
corresponding web sites all the professional
data information (such as office address,
office telephone number etc.) of the regional
health organization staff, as well as of the
university staff in all the cities that have an
academic institution. These data are not
sensitive if taken alone; in fact, the
transparency
laws
of
the
public
administrations mandate their availability; as
shown in the next section, it is their
combination with the public transport
dataset that could allow privacy breaches.
If this were not enough, as explained
previously the same sanitization algorithm
are not free from attacks. In particular when
there is the need to keep a good level of
utility, algorithms as k-anonymity have been
proven to be weak against attack where the
adversary have a previous (“a-priori”)
knowledge. The work of Machanavajjhala et
al. (2006) and the l-diversity algorithm have
been created to overcome these deanonymization issues of k-anonymity. As
well explained in Ghasemzade et al (2013),
anonymizing
public
transport
data
structured over a space with a high number
of dimensions has been studied widely, but
in general none of the proposed solutions
takes into account the clearing scenario with
its peculiar requisites about utility. In
Ghasemzadeh et al. (2013) the differences
between the different methods are clearly
detailed.
Ghinita et al. (2008) propose a permutation
method that groups transactions with close
proximity and then associates each group to
a set of mixed sensitive values. Terrovitis et

al. (2008) propose an algorithm to kanonymize transactions by generalization
based on some given taxonomy trees. He
and Naughton (2009) extend this method by
introducing local generalization, which
awards better quality. Xu et al. (2008)
extend the k-anonymity model by assuming
that an adversary knows at most a certain
number of transaction items of a target
victim, which is similar to our assumption of
limited background knowledge of an
adversary.
This is a very interesting model because it is
definitely related to our scenario. It deals
with attempts to gain a basic knowledge of
some transaction rows, which is equivalent
to get a certain number of possible travel
records of a user: a valuable outcome for an
attacker in our context. Yet, although their
method addresses the high-dimensionality
concern, it considers a transaction as a set
of items rather than a sequence; this makes
it useful to prevent attacks against the
privacy of single users, but not to prevent
attempts at general pattern discovery, which
is typical of insider threat attacks. Therefore,
it is not fully applicable to our problem,
which needs to take into consideration the
sequential ordering of travel data.
Furthermore, Xu et al. (2008) achieve their
privacy model by merely global suppression,
which significantly decrease information
quality on transport data.
The last reviewed model was developed by
Chen et al. (2011). It studies the releasing
of transport dataset while satisfying
differential privacy techniques. Although
they claim that their approach maintains
high quality and scalability in the context of
set-valued data and is applicable to the
relational data, their method is limited to
preserving information for supporting count
queries and frequent item-sets, as opposed
to Xu et al. (2008), and not passenger
tracking. The combination of these two
pieces of research is a very promising
research direction towards a complete
solution for our scenario.
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Table 5 - specialized approaches to sanitization that may fit well the clearing scenario
SOURCE
Ghasemzadeh et al.;
2013;

SUBJECT
LK-diversity
approach

Ghinita, G. and Tao, Y.
and Kalnis, P. (2008)

Anonymous
publication of
transactional data

Case Studies
This section presents some simple case
studies built along the lines of the illustrated
threats, showing how such concepts may
easily be applied to the case under
consideration. Two different threats are
considered:
1. an attacker who tracks the
movement of a specific person (one
of the authors) on the public
transport network, exemplifying a
threat to the privacy of individuals;
2. an attacker who is interested in
understanding what are the more
profitable areas in terms of regional
tickets sold, to challenge the
business
of
an
operator,
exemplifying a threat to trade
secrets of operators .
A summary of the data items collected by
operators for each ticket validation is
described in Table 6. The definition of the

CONTRIBUTION
Specifically tested on transport data, this approach
redesigns known techniques to overcome of their
limitations, dealing especially with the preservation of
useful information.
Introduces tools such as flow-graphs and transactional
probabilities, which are very effective to analyze the
loss of useful information.

minimal subset needed for clearing, and the
anonymization of the selected fields, are the
goal of the work in progress described in
section 6. However, it is immediately
possible to notice that the most sensitive
attribute and the only direct identifier (in
case of personal passes), i.e. the serial
number of the ticket, cannot be omitted.
Following its usage through the dataset
(possibly over a period of time that cannot
be known a priori) is the main function of the
clearing system, which has to compute the
share of revenue (generated when the ticket
was bought) to distribute to each carrier
which provided service to the ticket holder.
In a broader sense, it is possible to define
the required utility level of the dataset as
being very similar to the goal of a potential
attacker: that is, allowing to reconstruct a
traveller’s itinerary. It is worth detailing how
this reconstruction happens, to understand
also how an attacker could try the same
process and follow a traveller.

Table 6 - Database table storing trip information
Field name
CONTRACT SUPPORT
CONTRACT TYPE
VALIDATION TSP
VALIDATOR LOCATION
CONTRACT RESELLER
VALIDATION LINE
VALIDATION NR
VALIDATOR SERIAL
CONTRACT SN
VALIDATOR MODEL
VALIDATION ZONE
CONTRACT VALIDITY
CONTRACT ZONES

Content
Type of physical token
Type of contract (single trip, pass, etc.)
Timestamp of ticket usage
Placement of the validating equipment
Company which sold the ticket
Bus/tram/train line number
Number of parallel validations of the same ticket (e.g. many passengers
on a single pay-as-you-go ticket)
Serial number of validating equipment
Serial number of the ticket
Model of the validating equipment
Fare zone where the ticket was validated
Geographical extension of the contract (regional, urban, etc.)
Number of fare zones the contract allows to traverse
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The itinerary is “blurred” within the dataset,
because in the studied system passengers
validate tickets only when boarding a
bus/train, but not when leaving it.
Consequently, raw data does not show a
sequential structure; each row represents a
leg of a trip for a contract, but there is no
direct connection with the next legs of the
same contract. Each leg can be represented
by a structure like (A)T1  (B..Z),T2
meaning that on time-stamp T1 a user
(Contract_SN) goes from A in a known
direction (inferred from Validation_Line)
leading to a set of possible stops, one of
which is reached at T2. This introduces
uncertainty in the computation of the
number of traversed zones, which is needed
by the clearing system when a vehicle of a
different operator is used to continue the trip:
in this case, the end of the first leg must be
inferred from the validation that happens at
the start of the second one.
To this end a probabilistic flow-graph can be
exploited. According to Ghasemzadeh et al.
(2013) a probabilistic flow-graph is a tree
where each node represents a point in
space-time, the edges corresponds to
transitions between two places, leaving the
origin at a given time to reach the
destination at a different time, and each
transition has an associated probability of

being actually followed. For every node,
there may also be a non-zero termination
probability, which is the percentage of
passengers who exit the transportation
system at the node. By looking for
validations of the same contract that are
consecutive within a given time-frame, a
possible itinerary can be identified. For
example, if a validation (A)T1 could take a
passenger to (B..Z), and there is a
validation (D)T2, with the value of (T2-T1)
falling within a given threshold, a non-zero
probability can be associated to the edge
(A)T1(D)T2. The analysis can proceed
seeking for destinations that can be reached
from (D).
Table 7 and Figure 3 depict an example of
the probabilistic flow-graph derived from
one of our datasets for a few contracts. With
enough samples, probabilities can be
estimated with acceptable precision, and
the graph becomes a faithful enough
representation of the distribution of
passenger over the network. At the same
time, each set of itineraries for a given
contract represents the habits of a
passenger, enabling correlations with other
data sources (places around the nodes,
events close to the timestamps), and
potentially leading to the association
between the contract and a personal identity.

Table 7 - Table travel data in the sequential version
Serial

Sequential travel positions

70001112

(1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2->(3,248)T3->(1,245)T4

50004058

(1, 245)T3->(1, 245)T4-(1, 245)T6

50004077

(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T5

50004070

(4,260)T1->(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T5

70001386

(1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2

70001389

(1, 245)T3->(2,249)T4

75001498

(1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T4
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Figure 3 - Travel data represented as a probabilistic flow-graph

Stalking Franco Callegati
As a proof of concept, let us present the
case of an attacker who wants to target one
of the authors, to track his movement on the
public transport network. Franco Callegati is
a professor at the University of Bologna. He
has a public web page detailing the address
of his office which is located in the off-site
campus of Cesena, about 60 Km East of
Bologna, and showing that he works at the
Department of Electrical, Electronic and
Information Engineering, which has its
central offices in Bologna. The phone
directory lists his home address in Imola, a
smaller town about 30 Km east of Bologna.
Clearly from this basic data it can be
inferred that Callegati will mostly travel to
work from Imola to Cesena where he
teaches and tutor students, but he will likely
travel to Bologna too, for those sort of
activities requiring physical presence related
to the Department or to the University’s
central offices. Sometimes he will also travel
from Cesena to Bologna (or the other way)
when he has some commitment in both
sites in the same day.

With this background, an attacker who has
got a copy of the clearing dataset can
associate the victim’s identity with the serial
number of his MiMuovo pass. Callegati is
admittedly a very easy target, yet he serves
us well for the purpose of giving a concrete
and real example of usage of clearing
datasets. Given the almost non-existent
effort that allows a potential attacker to
reach his goal, there is little doubt that
“harder” targets can be exploited with some
more, but still reasonable effort; as already
illustrated at the end of section 4, even a
coarse localization of commuting start and
end points, when correlated with some
background information about the victim,
can yield significant results.
The dataset shows about 2,000 passengers
boarding trains that leave Imola in the
morning (all figures are computed as
averages on working days). Since the
validation occurs only at the start of the trip,
their destination is not explicit, but of course
it can be inferred with a good approximation
by coupling the onward trip of a given ticket
with the return trip. This further analysis
yields slightly more than 1,000 passengers
getting back from Bologna in the afternoon
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(Fig. 4, pink arrow) and slightly less than
200 passengers getting back from Cesena
(Fig. 4, grey arrow). The number of
candidates drops dramatically when only
passengers who travel alternatively to both

Bologna and Cesena in different days of the
week are considered. Only 14 MiMuovo
users show a commuting pattern of this kind
(Fig. 4, red arrow).

Figure 4 - Commuting flows from Imola to Bologna and Cesena
Note: Background cartography: http://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright - OpenStreetMap
contribs
The possible inferences do not stop here. It
is easy to check that the Callegati’s office in
Cesena is near enough to the train station
(15 minutes on foot), and that it is not
conveniently served by public transport
(direct bus only once an hour)3. An attacker
could make an educated guess that
Callegati will not take a bus when he leaves
Cesena’s train station, and thus eliminate
candidates who do it. Conversely, the site of
Callegati’s department in Bologna is twice
as far from Bologna’s train station,
compared to the Cesena situation, and
much better connected to it by bus (6 to 8
connections per hour). In this case an
educated guess would lead an attacker to
consider the exclusion of candidates who do
not board a bus in Bologna after reaching
3 The

whole public transport network of the
Emilia-Romagna Region is on Google Transit

the train station. Note also that the clearing
function can be computed without taking
into account the line number, but in case the
full database is leaked, or in case the line
number is kept on record for secondary
uses, it would be possible to further restrict
the set of candidates to those boarding one
of the two bus lines connecting the train
station with the department, out of the 19
serving the train station.
In our tests, this is enough to pinpoint the
victim. This result was reached without even
taking into account another very valuable
source of information, the timetable of the
lectures in Cesena, which would allow
establishing a precise spatio-temporal
constraint to the victim’s movements
towards one of his usual destinations. In
conclusion, by following these patterns, an
attacker can identify Callegati’s MiMuovo
card ID and then follow his movements also
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outside his most common habits
accessing the clearing database.

by

Unfair Competition
Ticket validation datasets contain potentially
useful information for an operator wishing to
uncover the business practices of its
competitors or challenge their business
practice. This kind of attack comes from the
inside, and it is very difficult to deal with.
Access control rules cannot be very strict
against insiders, who enjoy not only the
possibility of easier read-only access to
datasets, but also the opportunity to inject
carefully crafted data to stimulate the
production of particularly useful outputs, like
a cryptanalyst that is able to perform a
chosen plaintext attack.
One of the most valuable pieces of
information would be the planning strategy
in the usage of vehicles, which is a crucial
issue for a transport provider and that can
be inferred at some extent by exploiting the
information
in
VALIDATION
ZONE,
VALIDATOR LOCATION, and VALIDATION
LINE.
Here a simple and realistic inference is
shown, built by looking at the correlation
between the type of ticket and the zone of
its usage. It is a piece of information that
can give a very small margin of profit by
pushing sales of multi-trip tickets where they
are most appreciated, making profits on the
rate of unclaimed trips for lost tickets (what
is not claimed for clearing remains in the
pockets of the seller). This should clearly be
a small percentage of the whole ticket
volume. Nonetheless in today’s competitive
markets every source of income may be
vital; moreover the examples show that this
sort of analysis may pave the road to similar
analyses in “business areas” which are not
considered today, because they are
impossible to accurately explore in absence
of large datasets.
Over 30 data mining tests over the ticket
validation datasets were performed (Melis,
2014) using the Weka software (Hall et al.,
2009). The correlation of interest was best

highlighted by means of cluster analysis, i.e.
a set of exploratory techniques that aim to
group the unity of a population in statistics
on the basis of their similarity in terms of
values taken by the observed variables. As
an example, Figure 5 shows the result of
cluster analysis according to the Simple Kmeans 4 classifier. It is clear that the
attributes of the sold tickets form wellseparated clusters, whose significance can
be useful from a business perspective.
Once this hypothesis is verified, a
Bayesian 5 classifier allows to infer more
details over some attributes. The structure
of the clearing system allows an attacker to
feed the Bayesian classifier a large amount
of past knowledge from the snapshots. The
result is that the algorithm is able to
correctly predict the belonging to a given
cluster of over 90% of new instances.
This result needs to be interpreted in a
specific context in order to show the power
of this kind of attacks. The Bayesian test
shows that theoretically, by knowing only
the contract type and the validation zone, it
is possible to infer the correct serial number
of the contract support, which would reveal
the pseudo-identity of the contract holder.
Beneath the privacy risks for the contract
holder, this discovery would allow a
company to determine the history of a
pseudo-identity. This history would be
revealing the type of contract, along with its
movements, leading to a kind of profiling
and possible definition of targeted offers
that is usually regarded as unfair
competition in our context.
A more general attack is also possible,
again by using the results from cluster tests.
Cluster analysis usually aims to group the
elements of a population on the basis of
their similarity, in terms of values found in
the observed variables. However, if the
4

http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/cluste
rers/SimpleKMeans.html
5

http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/classif
iers/bayes/NaiveBayes.html
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focus is put on a particular attribute, for
example the contract type, it becomes
possible to trace the trend in terms of other
variables, for example (see again Figure 5)
how the contract is used in a group of
specific zones. This could easily lead an

operator to discover the contract distribution
of a competitor. So by intercepting this
market trend, once again, the opportunity
may arise to engage strategies deemed as
unfair competition.

Figure 5 - Results of a clustering analysis of the dataset with Weka

Privacy by Design
Having assessed the high potential risks
associated with data sharing, it is necessary
to investigate what is the best approach to
build security into the clearing system from
the early design phase, in which the authors
are involved.

Definition
Privacy by Design (PbD) is the principle by
which data protection and information
privacy is built into information systems from
the design stage. The idea builds on
existing notions of value-sensitive design,
code as law, and Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) (Koops and Leenes,
2014). Considerations about how to protect
people’s data and personal information
must enter the system development lifecycle from an early stage where
architectural decisions to protect privacy
can still be made (Cavoukian, 2009; Schaar,
2010; Spiekermann, 2012). Such earlystage design decisions are likely to be more
effective for the protection of privacy in a

new information system, as there are many
more options available to designers than to
the engineer who needs to patch the system
following a privacy incident (Brown, 2013;
Schaar, 2010).
Privacy is designed into an information
system
when
data
protection
and
information
privacy
principles
are
incorporated into the overall design of the
system (Schaar, 2010), thereby ensuring
that privacy becomes integral to the
organisational priorities, project objectives,
design processes and planning operations
(Cavoukian, 2009). A design that protects
data subjects’ privacy and maximises data
utility requires a multi-dimensional and
sophisticated consideration of the risks, and
how all the parts of the design operate
together (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). Privacy
by Design in European Law Recital 46 of
Directive 95/46 of the European Union
contains the requirement that “requires that
appropriate technical and organizational
measures be taken, both at the time of the
design of the processing system and at the
time of the processing itself, particularly in
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order to maintain security”. Article 17 of the
directive adds the requirement that “the
controller must implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to
protect personal data against accidental or
unlawful destruction or accidental loss,
alteration, unauthorized disclosure or
access [...]”.
Privacy by design goes further than mere
information security, as recognised by the
data protection by design and by default
requirement in the proposed General Data
Protection Regulation 2012/0011/COD.
Article 23 of the proposed Regulation
contains the requirement that controllers
implement measures to ensure “only those
personal data are processed which are
necessary for each specific purpose of the
processing and are especially not collected
or retained beyond the minimum necessary
for those purposes, both in terms of the
amount of the data and the time of their
storage.” Although this requirement is a step
in the direction of PbD, the proposed
methodologies in literature go further than
the European legislator has proposed.

Methodology
A synthesis from the literature shows the
following factors are essential to an effective
Privacy by Design strategy. This list does
not go into detail about specific deidentification techniques, software patterns
or other privacy enhancing technologies.
Rather, it is a list of more abstract factors
that contribute to a successful Privacy by
Design approach:
Define privacy risk assessment, goals &
strategy - An information system design
should start with an assessment of the risks
of the data that will be collected (see for
example Rotter (2008). The project
instigator should define clearly the goals he
or she wants to achieve in terms of privacy
protection, while consideration of how to
reach these will follow in further steps
(Spiekermann, 2012).
Holistic approach - The risk assessment
and goals will inform the privacy design

strategy, which is comprised of an iterative
approach of the steps below (Hoepman,
2012). It is vital the information system is
considered as a whole in a holistic approach.
An effective privacy by design strategy will
have privacy settings set by default, since
software settings are unlikely to be changed
by users (Cavoukian, 2009; Gross and
Acquisti, 2005; Mackay, 1991).
Data minimisation & Purpose limitation Information systems should be designed in
a way that they use the minimal necessary
personal
data,
without
necessarily
compromising on the functionality of the
system. Therefore, the purpose of the
system must be clearly defined and the
combinations of collectable personal data
analysed that are necessary for the full
functionality (Brown, 2013; Hourcade et al.,
2014; Schaar, 2010) . This makes data
minimisation a necessary and foundational
element of Privacy by Design (Gurses et al.,
2007).
De-identification and Aggregation - When
the necessary personal data have been
identified, the project instigator should
analyse to what extent the information
system can be operated without the
identifier fields of the data subjects in her
database. The database should be deidentified or aggregated to the furthest
extent possible. Although useful to increase
the privacy of data subjects, deidentification and aggregation are never fully
robust against re-identification practices and
should not be considered as a means to
circumvent the application of data protection
law to the project (Danezis and Troncoso,
2013; de Montjoye et al., 2013; Ohm, 2009;
Sharad and Danezis, 2013).
Secondary uses & Dissemination type Before deciding how best to de-identify any
collected data, the researcher must decide
how the research data will be disseminated
and which further uses the data will be
suitable for. For example, it may be required
that the data be shared in an open data
format, whereby the risk of privacy harms
will be significant, thus requiring the
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adoption of a strong de-identification
method. The project instigator can choose
to share the data only upon request, and
decide the method of dissemination on a
case by case basis, along with suitable legal
agreements, which should also be enforced
if breached (Zevenbergen et al., 2013).
Transparency/openness - The OECD
established that data controllers must be
transparent about the information processes
where personal data is processed (OECD,
1980). This is achieved by informing the
potential data subject about the information
processing before gathering informed
consent in a lawful manner, while also
complying with the data subject’s rights
such as maintaining the accuracy of the
data and allowing access to correct the data
(Brown, 2013; Schaar, 2010; Spiekermann,
2012).
Accountability - Privacy by Design is not
merely a technical process, but must be
complemented by information security,
functionality,
operational
efficiency,
organizational
control
and
business
processes that enable a trustworthy
information environment (Koops and
Leenes, 2014). A careful Security by Design
plan must also be set up, whereby topics
such as encryption and access limitations
are ensured (Brown, 2013; Spiekermann,
2012). A plan must be established for when
unforeseen risks materialise, and legal
agreements on information sharing must be
enforced effectively.

Application
In order to take the described factors into
account when designing the clearing system,
we propose to undertake an iterative
approach described by the following steps:

algorithms that provide the most
effective concealment of sensitive
data without jeopardizing its utility
for legitimate uses;
3. Verification - evaluate the results to

formally verify that the privacy
policies are respected and that the
resulting dataset actually preserves
its intended utility. If some basic
constraint is found violated, or
margins for further improvement are
visible, the cycle is reiterated to
achieve the foreseen refinement,
otherwise the process stops. Note
that this step could highlight an
intrinsic contradiction between some
of the privacy policies and some of
the analysis requirements, leading
either to the decision to relax some
requirement or to the conclusion
that the desired scenario is
unachievable.
The last step of the iterative process calls
for a formal metric to evaluate correctness
and effectiveness. The literature already
provides useful methodologies for this
purpose.
Ganta and Acharya (2008) studied the
general problem of fusion resilient
anonymization. They stated the problem as
a search for the optimal value of an
objective which is the weighted sum of
protection and utility. Protection is
measured in terms of how hard is for an
adversary to gain information by correlating
the anonymized dataset with external
sources. More formally, if P is the original
sensitive dataset, and P I is the sanitized

1. Data

release of P , an adversary can exploit
information fusion techniques to derive a
de-sanitized version Pˆ from P I. The
effectiveness of the applied sanitization
process is measured as the dissimilarity
between Pˆ and P .

2. Sanitization techniques - choose

Brickell and Shmatikov (2008) performed a
similar analysis, again studying the trade-off
between utility and protection, but on a
more formal level. Their claim was quite

minimization - take into
account the needs of the legitimate
analysers to define the smallest set
of attributes that allow performing
the intended computations;
the perturbation and generalization
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thought-provoking:
sophisticated
anonymization techniques offer no real
advantages over trivial ones, i.e. datasets
sanitized with complex application of
generalization and perturbation algorithms,
depending on the algorithm parameters,
either provide no additional utility vs.
trivially-sanitized datasets, or leak much
more information to adversaries than what
is gained in terms of legitimate analysis.
Besides posing interesting questions that
researchers in this field could find useful to
orientate their efforts, their paper also
provides formal definitions for various
metrics related to privacy of data tables and
utility of sanitized databases. In particular,
they study privacy both under a syntactic
perspective (pure statistical correlation) and
under a semantic perspective, measuring
the gain in adversarial knowledge afforded
by the sanitized table.
Bishop et al. (2010) explore the topic by
focusing on relationships that can be used
to desanitize sensitive data. They model the
problem of data sanitization as a double set
of assertions, made of the constraints
defining the privacy properties that must
hold against adversarial attacks, and of the
targets defining the information that the
legitimate analysts want to extract from the
sanitized dataset. They highlight the
importance of defining a precise threat
model as a requisite for drawing complete
and concrete privacy policies, and a precise
analysis policy that, in opposition to the
privacy policy, puts limits to the sanitization
process to avoid excessive loss of utility.
They exploit ontologies to automate
reasoning over these opposing requisites
and solve the constraint satisfaction
problem they represent. A question they
leave open is: what is the most appropriate
language to express these requirements?
To define our specific privacy by design
process, we plan to investigate and possibly
apply the common concepts and techniques
presented in all of these works, in addition
to a specific and noteworthy suggestion that
comes from the last one. In the words of the
authors: “Perhaps the most constructive

approach is to provide two sets of
relationships.
The
first
lists
those
relationships that are known to hold in the
raw data, and must not hold if desanitization
is to be prevented. The second is a set of
relationships that, if they held, would enable
desanitization. The sanitizer can deal with
the first set as appropriate. The second
enables the sanitizer to perform a simple
risk analysis, centred on two questions: (1)
What is the probability that the relationships
in this set hold; (2) What is the probability
that the adversary will be able to determine
that the relationships hold, and use that to
desanitize the data?”. This approach seems
to be especially useful because it allows
both designing sanitization by evaluating the
effectiveness of the planned techniques,
and to measure and understand the risks
deriving from future evolutions of the
intended use of the datasets.

Conclusions
This manuscript highlights the privacy
threats that can emerge from sharing or
publishing the data related to usage of
public mobility tickets. In the context of an
integrated mobility system run by a set of
operators, sharing data about tickets usage
become mandatory for revenue clearing
purposes. Unfortunately this may also pave
the road to privacy attacks to individuals or
institutions, such as, but not limited to those
exemplified in this paper.
An ample discussion is presented of how
the sanitization approaches could work in
this scenario, and what their limitations are;
it lays the ground for future research aimed
both at improving the effectiveness of
sanitization techniques in the specific
scenario, and to derive generally-applicable
principles.
As an alternative solution, the applicability
of the “privacy by design” approach is
examined. In the context of the design of
the data sharing system for clearing
purposes, its aim is to minimize the
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likelihood of the emergence of privacy
threats. The general-purpose definition of
the approach is integrated with an
implementation plan that takes into account
a variety of literature sources to verify the
effectiveness of the applied methodology, in
order to iteratively converge towards the
solution that strikes the most appropriate
balance between data utility and privacy,
possibly quantifying the effects of a breach.
The first set of research questions,
regarding the suitability of existing
techniques to protect privacy in the public
transport scenario, has thus being
answered in a substantially negative way.
The second wave of research questions, on
the possible definition of a more effective
framework to devise privacy-enhanced data
management processes, has been partially
addressed. The present study meets its
main limitations here: the negative findings
from the review phase, and the realization
that similar initiatives actually deal with less
demanding requisites, were useful in
highlighting the deficiencies of current
approaches and lead to devise suggestions
on how the framework could be structured,
yet its concrete development will be the
subject of future work.
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